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The Problem: Decision-making among a collection of interacting entities, or agents, entails aggregating the beliefs
of the constituent agents to guide the behavior of the system as a whole. If the agents’ beliefs are unconstrained,
then cyclic outcomes are highly likely, in the worst cases reaching probability one. Often the systems are driven into
chaotic behavior. How, then, can one improve the odds for reaching a stable concensus?
Motivation: Collective behavior based on the aggregation of individual preferences is widespread. One obvious
application is in societal decision-makingwhen a group of individuals(or nations) must aggregatetheir diverse prefer-
ences. Another application is to understand the human brain, which can be viewed as consisting of a large number of
semi-autonomousneural modules acting as ”agents” (Minsky, 1986; van Essen et al. 1992.) If we assume these kinds
of aggegation processes are not subject to a ”dictator” (such as a homunculus), then there is always the possibility
of unstable outcomes, meaning that there may be cycles among alternatives (Arrow, 1963; McKelvey, 1979; Saari &
Haunsperger, 1991.) Yet most collective decisions, espcecially our own percepts, are stable, singular and typically
compelling. Hence we seek some simple, plausible constraints on the voting behaviors of any society of agents, such
that concensus is almost always reached. [3].
Previous Work: The key constraint is that an agent’s choices should be consistent with a ”mental model” that is
shared by all the agents (Richards et al, 1998.) This shared model forces the pereference orderings for an agent’s
alternative choices to be correlated with the preference orderings of the other agents, rather than being just a random
order. These ”mental models” express the relations between the alternatives, and hence can be represented as a graph,
with the vertices of the graph being the alternatives, and the edges showing the relationships between alternatives.
Given the vertex representing an agent’s ﬁrst choice, his second choices will then be those alternatives represented by
the adjacent vertices, etc. If all agent’s choices are consistent with the shared ”mental model”, then concensus will be
reached better than 90% of the time for mental models generated as random graphs. [1]
Approach: Mental Models depicted as random graphs have two important variables that affect the probability of
reaching concensus: the number of vertices, n, and the probability of an edge, p. If p = 1, then we can show that
concensus will always be achieved. (A weaker condition for concensus is that the graph simply be covered.) As p -¿
0, the odds for concensus decreases. This result is shown in Fig. 1, where the ordinate shows the probability of no
agreement. These results are for random graphs only. For certain types of graphs, such as those with covers, k-partite
constructions, or unrootedtrees, we can show that concensuswill always be reached if the graph structure is respected
in thepreference orderings.
Impact: Although concensus occurs roughly 90% of the time or better when a mental model is shared among agents,
an important lesson is that the form of the mental model is an important variable in collective stability. Furthermore,
contraryto ﬁndingsthat emphasizethe stability-inducingpropertiesofprobabilisticchoice,such as the CondorcetJury
Theorem or probabilistic voting, our results suggest that a failure to reach concensus becomes more likely if agents
choose randomly from alternatives over which they have no ﬁrm knowledge.
Future Work: Our own Mental Models are not arbitrary, and tend to have certain forms. For example, heirarchical
trees, ”subway maps”, linear orderings are very common. Which of these forms are likely to achieve concensus, and
which not ? There are also severe limits on how many alternatives an agent can handle at once (e.g. ”magical number
seven”),whichrestrictsthescopeofamodel,oratleast its”active”region. Theeffectsofunintentionalmisorderingsof
preferences(ie ”noise”) is unexplored,and the related issue of ”mis-matched”mental models. Alternatives may not be
symmetically related; hence directed graphs should be understood. Certain asymptotic conditions remain unresolved.
Finally, we would like to design a neural net that would perform a pair-wise comparison of weighted alternatives,
related by arbitrary graphical forms.
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